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Abstract
This article aims to examine the effect of intra‐institutional conflicts in the European Commission on the extent of changes
made to legislative proposals in trilogue negotiations.Wedevelop and test three hypotheses related to how conflictswithin
the Commission, namely that intra‐institutional disagreements during policy formulation (h1), and potential conflicts with
previous (h2) or subsequent (h3) colleges of commissioners, increase the number of amendments to the Commission’s
proposal adopted in trilogues. To test our hypotheses, we use a new dataset measuring the number of changes between
Commission proposals and adopted legislation for 216 legislative acts negotiated between 2012 and 2019 by means of
text‐mining techniques. It is important to note that we control for differences between the Commission’s proposals and
the co‐legislators’ positions in order to distinguish between an effect on preferences anticipation and on the negotiations
proper. Our results indicate that intra‐institutional conflicts affect the Commission’s anticipation of the co‐legislators’ posi‐
tions. The effect on its behaviour in trilogues, that is, after the legislative proposal has been tabled, is less clear. Regarding
the latter, only the number of Directorates‐General involved is significantly linked with the number of amendments tabled.
These findings suggest that while intra‐institutional disagreements affect the Commission’s role in trilogues, the range of
preferences is more important than the intensity of conflicts.
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1. Introduction
The European Commission (henceforth referred to as
the Commission) is composed of multiple services,
Directorates‐General (DGs) and 27 commissioners, who
may have different policy preferences. Yet, the col‐
lege of commissioners (College), as the highest polit‐
ical level in the Commission, adopts legislative pro‐
posals collegially. This principle of collegiality implies
collective decision‐making, which, in the case of dis‐
agreement within the College, most likely results in
compromise decisions (Ershova, 2019; Wonka, 2008).
In other words, the resulting proposals do not cor‐
respond exactly to the preferences of every commis‐
sioner. Nevertheless, because of the principle of colle‐
giality, all commissioners are collectively responsible for
College decisions. These Commission proposals, agreed
in the College, constitute the basis for legislative nego‐
tiations in trilogues between the European Parliament,
the Council of the European Union (in the following, sim‐
ply referred to as the Parliament and the Council), and
the Commission.
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The Parliament and the Council, having the formal
decision‐making right, usually modify the Commission’s
proposal, whereas the Commission is present to
defend its proposal and foster a deal. Generally, one
lead commissioner is responsible for representing the
Commission in these meetings. Hence, in the case of
disagreement within the College, this commissioner
must defend a proposal with which they might not fully
agree. This raises the question of whether they do so
properly. For example, the commissioner could try to
promote their own preferences or simply not defend
a provision they do not support. In this article we aim
to address this issue by focusing on the following ques‐
tions: Do intra‐institutional conflicts in the Commission
impact the behaviour of its representatives in trilogue
negotiations in a way that leads to an increasing num‐
ber of amendments adopted by Council and Parliament
broadly speaking? We assume that the lead commis‐
sioner―who represents the Commission in trilogues—
has less incentive to defend proposals with which they
potentially disagree, leading to more amendments.
When analysing European Union (EU) legislative
negotiations, including trilogues, existing research usu‐
ally treats the Commission as a unitary actor instead
of taking its various intra‐institutional actors and pref‐
erences into account (Gastinger, 2017; Rauh, 2020).
Conflicts and disagreements between commissioners,
however, are likely to arise during the procedure that
leads to a legislative proposal. We expect these disagree‐
ments to spill over into inter‐institutional negotiations.
As previous research has shown, intra‐institutional con‐
flicts are an important factor in explaining the EU institu‐
tions’ (in)ability to defend their preferences in negotia‐
tions (Costello & Thomson, 2013; Tsebelis, 2002). Yet, lit‐
tle is known about their impact on the Commission’s
role, that is on the behaviour of its representatives in
the legislative process, although the Commission partic‐
ipates in all steps of inter‐institutional legislative nego‐
tiations. This lack of knowledge when it comes to fac‐
tors influencing the Commission’s role in trilogues may
seem surprising but is consistent with ‘the near total
absence of any discussion of [the Commission’s] role
in the spate of recent analyses of early agreements’
(Kreppel, 2018, p. 16).
Against this backdrop, this article aims to exam‐
ine the effects of intra‐institutional conflicts in the
Commission on the extent of changesmade to legislative
proposals, the present article helps to fill this research
gap. To that end, we develop and test three hypotheses
related to disagreements within the Commission: intra‐
institutional conflicts during policy formulation (h1),
and potential conflicts with the previous (h2) or subse‐
quent (h3) College. To test our hypotheses, we use a
new dataset measuring the number of changes between
Commission proposals and adopted legislation for 216
legislative acts negotiated between 2012 and 2019.
By examining whether the Commission’s intra‐
institutional policy has an impact on the results of the
EU legislative procedure, we help fill two gaps in the
current literature. First, existing research shows that
decision‐making dynamics within the Commission vary
from file to file (Rauh, 2020; Van Ballaert, 2017), and
that intra‐institutional conflicts can arise in this pro‐
cess (Hartlapp et al., 2014; Rauh, 2019). The way in
which a proposal is prepared and adopted affects its
content (Bürgin, 2017; Hartlapp et al., 2014), the time
for adoption (Chalmers, 2014; Rasmussen & Toshkov,
2013), the Commission’s ability to correctly foresee the
co‐legislators’ preferences (Bunea & Thomson, 2015), or
the level of discretion granted for the implementation of
the adopted legislation (Ershova, 2019). Therefore, intra‐
institutional dynamics and conflicts can affect legislative
decision‐making. Yet, despite these findings, we know
little about whether the Commission’s intra‐institutional
decision‐making processes have consequences for the
fate of legislative proposals that result from these very
same processes.
Second, we know little about the Commission’s
behaviour in trilogues and potential consequences for
the legislative process following from this behaviour.
While the Commission’s relevance in legislative nego‐
tiations is debated, the few articles that examine the
Commission in trilogues compare legislative files nego‐
tiated in trilogues with files that follow the formal pro‐
cedure outside of trilogues (Cross & Hermansson, 2017;
Hartlapp et al., 2013; Kreppel, 2018). With trilogues
nowadays being the main fora of legislative negotia‐
tions, these comparisons become less relevant to under‐
stand the current EU legislative decision‐making, since
almost all co‐decision files are negotiated in trilogues
(Kluger Dionigi & Koop, 2017). Therefore, research on the
Commission’s behaviour and influence in trilogues needs
to continue outside of such comparisons.
From this perspective, this article contributes empiri‐
cally to the debates regarding the Commission’s power
vis‐à‐vis the Parliament and the Council by indirectly
testing whether and when the Commission matters in
trilogues. If the intra‐institutional decision‐making of
the Commission is important for the outcome of tri‐
logues, this would suggest that what happens intra‐
institutionally in the Commission is an important fac‐
tor to understand the outcomes of inter‐institutional
negotiations and, consequently, that it might have
power therein. In other words, if the Commission’s intra‐
institutional dynamics influence the negotiations, the
Commission’s preferences may be an important factor
to understand the dynamics that lead to the trilogue
agreement. If the Commission’s substantive preferences
do not matter for trilogues, its representatives should
only be able to play a mediator role between the two
co‐legislators, not defending their own position on the
legislation. If so, the internal dynamics would have no
impact on the fate of the proposal after it has been
issued. In contrast, we find that quarrels within the
Commission can affect the outcome of the negotiations
between the co‐legislators, which is possible insofar
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as the Commission representatives are able to defend
their preferences, to some extent, against the will of
the co‐legislators.
Addressing those gaps therefore contributes to a
better understanding of both the EU legislative pro‐
cess, especially trilogues, and the Commission’s intra‐
institutional politics. In line with the overall aim of
this special issue, we examine how the change of
informal rules that lead to the systematic use of tri‐
logues (instead of following the formal legislative pro‐
cedure) affects the Commission. As this development
affected intra‐ and inter‐institutional dynamics between
the co‐legislators (Laloux, 2020), the same should be true
for the Commission, yet it remains unclear.
Of course, other factors can influence the Commis‐
sion’s behaviour in trilogues as well. If the file under
negotiation is, for example, a priority file of the Com‐
mission’s work programme, the Commission might be
more likely to push for its own positions, trying to limit
the co‐legislator’s amendments to the text. Moreover,
external factors could also affect trilogues and the
Commission’s behaviour therein. If, for example, public
attention to a file increases due to a political crisis, more
pressure might be put on all negotiating parties. These
are noteworthy limitations of this study, and, as such,
they must be taken into account when considering it.
However, while it is to be expected that such factors have
an effect on the Commission’s behaviour and influence
as well, it is likely that they do not contradict but inter‐
act with our findings. Our results thus pave the way for
future research to analyse the behaviour and effect of
the Commission in trilogues.
The article is structured as follows: The next section
provides an overview of trilogues with a focus on the
role of the Commission therein. Before presenting the
data set, Section 3 develops our hypotheses based on
the literature on the intra‐institutional functioning of the
Commission. The article concludeswith a presentation of
the empirical results in Section 5, and a summary of the
main arguments and findings.
2. Who Influences What? The Commission in Trilogues
In the EU, almost all legislative files are adopted under
the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP), which requires
the Parliament and the Council to agree on a common
text based on a Commission proposal. Almost all leg‐
islative negotiations between these institutions to reach
a common text are now conducted in informal meet‐
ings called ‘trilogues’ by a small group of representa‐
tives of the three institutions at the earliest stage of
the OLP (Laloux, 2020; Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019).
In terms of legislative decision‐making, trilogues have
thus become the standard way of negotiating in the
EU, so that nowadays, the vast majority of legislation
is thus adopted early on in the process (either at first
or early second reading) on the basis of informal com‐
promises. To put it plainly, there is hardly any legisla‐
tion under the OLP that is not adopted early. The only
files that do not go through trilogues are those that do
not require negotiations for there is no disagreement
(Kluger Dionigi & Koop, 2017). The Parliament’s activity
report on the 8th parliamentary term substantiates the
importance of trilogues in EU legislation: Among the 401
OLP files adopted and signed between 2014 and 2019,
‘1,185 trilogues took place at different stages of the leg‐
islative procedure (first, early second and second read‐
ing)’ (European Parliament, 2019, p. 8).
In all of these negotiations, the Commission is always
present. Its trilogue delegation usually consists of offi‐
cials ‘always at a high level of hierarchy…together with
support staff’ (Roederer‐Rynning & Greenwood, 2015,
p. 1155). The main role of these Commission represen‐
tatives in trilogues is to facilitate a compromise between
the positions of the Parliament and the Council (Burns,
2014; Nugent & Rhinard, 2019). However, little is known
about the Commission in trilogues beyond that. While
the impact of trilogues on the Commission—although
analysed in the literature—remains unclear, the impact
of the Commission on trilogue negotiations is largely
unknown. More generally, the fact that the Commission
has no formal decision‐making power over EU legislation
has prompted debates about its role and influence in leg‐
islative negotiations (Rasmussen, 2012). Two opposing
positions have been taken in the literature regarding the
Commission’s role in trilogues.
On the one hand, some recognize the Commission as
an important actor in EU legislative negotiations (Becker
et al., 2016; Nugent & Rhinard, 2019). Not only does
the Commission have its own policy preferences dis‐
tinct from the co‐legislators (Fuglsang & Olsen, 2009;
Thomson, 2011), but it also has several resources to
defend them and exert influence during negotiations
(Nugent & Rhinard, 2016). For example, it can with‐
draw its proposal (Nugent & Rhinard, 2016; Thomson &
Hosli, 2006) or amend it during the legislative procedure,
thereby affecting the Council’s voting rules (Fuglsang &
Olsen, 2009). Informal resources at the disposal of the
Commission include its informational advantage vis‐à‐vis
the co‐legislators (e.g., König et al., 2007; Nugent &
Rhinard, 2016) or its brokerage position that allows it to
play a crucial mediating role in the negotiations (Costello
& Thomson, 2013; Nugent & Rhinard, 2016; Thomson
& Hosli, 2006). This combination of formal power and
informational advantages provides the Commission with
the potential to influence the outcome of negotiations
(Costello & Thomson, 2013; König et al., 2007).
On the other hand, others argue that the Commission
only plays a limited role in trilogues. Since the Parliament
and the Council interact directly from the beginning of
the negotiations, they do not need to rely on the Com‐
mission for information on the preferences of their coun‐
terpart. As a result, the importance of the Commission’s
mediation role might decrease in trilogues, potentially
also limiting its impact on the negotiations (Kreppel
& Oztas, 2017; Kurpas et al., 2008). Furthermore, the
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formal conditions to modify the Commission proposal
are less strict during the first reading, as the co‐legislators
have neither time nor amendment limits. Thus, first read‐
ings are less favourable for the Commission (Cross &
Hermansson, 2017). Other aspects of trilogues, such as
the involvement of the Commission’s civil servants who
often lack political skills (Fuglsang & Olsen, 2009), or the
Commission’s preference for some change to none (Häge
& Kaeding, 2007), weaken its position in trilogues.
Overall, whether we assume that the Commission
lost or preserved its role in trilogues, the relation‐
ship between the Commission and the co‐legislators
is an important factor in trilogues. Especially the con‐
gruence between the Commission’s proposal and the
co‐legislators’ preferences is crucial with regard to
the amendments proposed by the Parliament and the
Council to the legislative file (Bailer, 2014; Cross &
Hermansson, 2017). Themore the co‐legislators disagree
with the policies in the proposal, the more they try to
modify it. Conversely, research has shown that the prox‐
imity of their positions to the Commission’s proposal
increases their bargaining success (Costello & Thomson,
2013; Franchino & Mariotto, 2013). Another aspect of
the institutional relationship that influences trilogues
are the co‐legislators’ intra‐institutional dynamics. Cross
and Hermansson (2017), for example, have shown that
these dynamics affect the capacity of the Commission to
defend its proposals.
Few studies, however, have examined whether the
Commission’s intra‐institutional dynamics influence tri‐
logue negotiations as well. Looking not specifically at tri‐
logues but at the overall legislative procedures in the
EU; we know, for example, that the number of staff in
the lead DG (Bailer, 2014) or the external consultation
conducted by the Commission (Bunea & Thomson, 2015)
influence its ability to defend the proposal. Rauh (2020)
finds that the capacity to anticipate the co‐legislators’
preferences, and thereby the number of amendments,
varies across DGs depending on their experience and
degree of coordination. Focusing on trilogues specifi‐
cally, scholars observed that the Commission thoroughly
prepares its trilogue mandates through an elaborate
intra‐institutional process (e.g., Page, 2012; Panning,
2021). Yet, so far these findings have not been linked
with the subsequent trilogue negotiations. Nevertheless,
those findings suggest that we should not only relax
the assumption of the Commission as a unitary actor
to better understand its behaviour and, following from
that, the results of the EU legislative process, but that
we should also pay more attention to the influence
of the Commission’s intra‐institutional dynamics on tri‐
logue negotiations and, thus, trilogue outcomes.
3. How the Commission’s Intra‐Institutional
Disagreements May Influence Trilogue Amendments
To approach the puzzle whether the Commission’s
intra‐institutional disagreements affect the number
of the co‐legislators’ amendments, we develop three
hypotheses regarding this effect of intra‐institutional
Commission dynamics. The first hypothesis considers
potential effects of intra‐institutional conflict in the
Commission on the number of amendments submitted
by the co‐legislators during trilogues. The second and
third hypotheses look at the effects of potential disagree‐
ments with the previous and subsequent Colleges on the
number of adopted amendments.
3.1. Intra‐Institutional Conflicts during Internal
Decision‐Making
The Commission is not a unitary actor. On the contrary,
each DG and commissioner respectively prefers differ‐
ent policy outcomes (Ershova, 2019; Killermann, 2018).
However, as discussed, the final decisions about legisla‐
tive proposals are taken collegially in the Commission.
In other words, all commissioners should agree with the
decisions and, in turn, all commissioners are collectively
responsible for them. This principle of collegiality implies
that, in the case of disagreementwithin the College, deci‐
sions are likely to be a compromise among the differ‐
ent positions (Ershova, 2019; Wonka, 2008). Thus, all
commissionersmustmake concessions and, thereby, will
agree to a greater or lesser extent with the resulting
College decision.
Since actors inside the Commission behave strategi‐
cally to assert their preferences (Hartlapp et al., 2014),
conflict may occur between different DGs and commis‐
sioners alike about the form and content of a legislative
proposal. While the lead DG is in the most favourable
position to defend its preferences, the College always
takes the final decision. This “shadow of the vote” neces‐
sitates the integration of the positions of other DGs, as
‘the threat to take a proposal to the College allows other
commissioners to effectively restrict the political leeway
of formally responsible commissioners’ (Wonka, 2008,
p. 1158). To this end, the Commission has developed a
sophisticated system of preparatory bodies where DGs,
cabinets, and commissioners discuss proposals under
negotiation in trilogues to ensure that diverging pref‐
erences and suggestions are taken into account (Page,
2012; Panning, 2021).
Hence, the preference of the lead DG might deviate
from the position expressed in the proposal approved
by the College. In such cases, Commission negotiators in
trilogues must defend a position that might differ from
their own and, consequently, with which they do not
fully agree. They therefore have incentives to try to steer
the negotiations towards their own preferences, or, at
least, to not support the adopted Commission proposal
wholeheartedly. Although the preparatory bodies of the
Commission agree on a mandate for the Commission
negotiators (Page, 2012; Panning, 2021), trilogues are
not only secluded and thus difficult to monitor, but ex‐
post sanctions are difficult for the Commission, since it
lacks decision‐making power. Delreux and Laloux (2018)
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observed such a situation: Their interviewees suggested
that the lead DG, representing the Commission in tri‐
logues, supported several co‐legislators’ amendments
that were more in line with its own preferences than the
original Commission proposal, which was the result of
intra‐institutional compromises.
Similarly, the diverging views of Commission actors
also imply that the Commission may be less able
to anticipate what is acceptable for the co‐legislators.
Having different standpoints, DGs may interpret the
co‐legislators’ preferences differently, or may be more
interested in defending certain policies than in anticipat‐
ing the co‐legislators’ preferences (Rauh, 2020). In both
cases, the fact that the proposal is based on a compro‐
mise decreases the likelihood of accurate anticipation.
In the absence of conflicts, the Commission faces fewer
obstacles in estimating the co‐legislators’ views. Hence,
we expect:
h1: If the intra‐institutional decision‐making inside
the Commission is conflictual, the number of amend‐
ments by the co‐legislators to a legislative proposal
increases.
3.2. Potential Disagreements with the Previous and
Subsequent College of Commissioners
Not only conflicts within a College, but also potential
disagreements with the previous or subsequent College
may have an impact on the number of amendments.
The preferences of commissioners decisively shape the
positions of their DGs (Thomson, 2011; Wonka, 2007).
However, it is likely that new commissioners set different
priorities compared to their predecessors (Dinan, 2016).
At the same time, EU legislative decision‐making is often
a lengthy process, such that commissioners frequently
inherit proposals from their predecessors. In such cases,
it is possible that the new lead commissioner does
not fully support the proposal in the form adopted by
their predecessors. Consequently, Commission represen‐
tatives in trilogues may have an incentive not to defend
these proposals as much as they could, resulting in an
increased number of accepted amendments. Hence, the
second hypothesis:
h2: Proposals issued by the previous Commission are
more likely to be amended.
Consequently, when nearing the end of a Commission’s
term, the incumbent commissioner in charge may antic‐
ipate that their successor will not defend their propos‐
als, which are still under negotiation, to the same extent
as they would have. Therefore, they may want to con‐
clude as many trilogues as possible before the end of
the mandate to close the deal before a new Commission
takes office. For the sake of speeding up the negotiation
process, the lead commissioner, therefore, may be will‐
ing to make more concessions, or to propose different
solutions more acceptable to the co‐legislators. In other
words, the commissioners may prefer to close a file in
their term by accepting more amendments over risk‐
ing even more modifications to their proposals when
handing over to a new Commission. Accordingly, we
expect that the less time Commission negotiators have
to finish negotiations, the more they are willing to con‐
cede to speed up a file’s adoption. This effect of antic‐
ipation can be observed with regard to the issuing of
Commission proposals: The Commission initiates more
proposals around the end of its term (Kovats, 2009).
Accordingly, we hypothesise:
h3: The closer the end of a Commission’s term, the
more proposals are amended by the co‐legislators
before the final adoption.
4. Data
We measure the dependent variable, that is, the extent
to which a Commission proposal is amended by the co‐
legislators, using DocuToads, aminimumediting distance
algorithm that was specifically developed to quantify
the extent of amendments made to Commission propos‐
als in the resulting legislative act (Cross & Hermansson,
2017). Minimum edit distance algorithms quantify the
degree of (dis)similarity of two texts by calculating
the ‘minimum number of editing operations required
to transform one [text] into another’ (Hermansson &
Cross, 2016, p. 10). Specifically, DocuToads considers
four types of editing operations: deletion, insertion,
substitution, and word transposition. In turn, the mini‐
mum number of these operations required to transform
Commission proposals into final acts indicates the sub‐
stantial amount of changes made between versions of
the texts (Hermansson & Cross, 2016).
Not only is the validity of this method theoreti‐
cally justified by its creators, but, more importantly,
the reliability of the algorithm’s results has been con‐
firmed by replicating existing studies on amendment
tracking (Hermansson & Cross, 2016) and comparing it
with the results of qualitative case studies on EU legisla‐
tive decision‐making (Laloux & Delreux, 2018). This last
point explains our choice to use DocuToads instead of
other text reuse methods (e.g., Gava et al., 2021). Unlike
other algorithms, DocuToads was specifically developed
to study amendments to Commission proposals and its
validity for this purpose has thus been confirmed by
other studies of the EU legislative process. Thus, we
can be confident that it works as we expect it to, with‐
out the need for further verification, which might be
less the case for methods developed for other contexts.
Still, an important limitation of this approach is that it
only considers the relative magnitude of the changes
made and not their substantive meaning. Since we are
interested in the former, this limitation is acceptable.
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind when interpret‐
ing the results.
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In line with the argument of Laloux and Delreux
(2020) that in many important respects the recitals are
an integral part of the legislative act, alongside the arti‐
cles themselves, and that consequently amendments to
them should be taken into account, we use the whole
body of the legislative act, i.e., the recitals and the
articles of the proposal. To compare between legisla‐
tive files of different length the distance between a
Commission proposal and the final compromisewas stan‐
dardised, dividing the number of editing operations by
the total number of words in the Commission propos‐
als. The degree ofmodification between the Commission
proposal and the final legislation was measured on 216
early agreements negotiated and adopted on first read‐
ing between December 2012 and 2019. Noteworthy, as
our study focuses on trilogues, we did not select trivial
adoption, for which no negotiation is needed because
the legislators already agree. Moreover, our dataset only
includes first reading agreements, which means that our
findings are not necessarily applicable to trilogues lead‐
ing to early second reading adoption. Yet, this decision is
justified by the fact that it enables controlling for differ‐
ences between first and early second reading, especially
since the latter is rarer (for a discussion on this point see
Laloux, 2020).
Turning to the independent variables, we use two
proxies to measure whether conflict occurred during
the internal decision‐making of the Commission (h1).
The first proxy is College adoption of a proposal by oral
or written procedure. A proposal is adopted by writ‐
ten procedure when there is no disagreement between
commissioners that would need a debate in the College
(Osnabrügge, 2015). Conversely, oral procedures con‐
cern sensitive issues for which disagreements must
be settled at College meetings (Hartlapp et al., 2014).
The use of oral procedures therefore indicates a higher
level of intra‐institutional conflict (Killermann, 2018).
The mode of decision for each proposal is available
on EUR‐Lex. The second proxy is the number of DGs
involved in the drafting of the proposal, as identified in
the impact assessment accompanying a proposal. DGs,
which are not responsible for a proposal, can contribute
to the drafting thereof through inter‐service coordina‐
tion (Blom‐Hansen & Senninger, 2021; Panning, 2021).
While every DG can participate, none is compelled to do
so. Hence, arguably, they participate only when they are
interested in a file. The number of participating DGs is
therefore an indication of the extent of diverging inter‐
ests within the Commission regarding the proposal.
To determine the effect of the previous Commission’s
adoption (h2), we use a dichotomous variablemeasuring
whether the Commission issuing the act was the same
as the one under which the legislation was adopted.
Time before the end of term (h3) is calculated by the
number of days between the last trilogue and the end
of term of the Commission in charge. The date of the
last trilogue was retrieved from the Committee of the
Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States to the European Union (Coreper) brief‐
ings of the negotiations, which are available in the public
register of Council documents.
We also control for several variables. First, we control
for the difference between the Commission proposal and
the trilogue mandates of the Parliament and the Council.
Since the co‐legislators have the decision‐making power,
such a difference is a crucial indicator of the number
of amendments to a proposal (Bailer, 2014; Kreppel,
2018). In fact, controlling for the difference is neces‐
sary to test whether conflicts within the Commission
have an impact on trilogues and not merely on the
Commission’s ability to anticipate the co‐legislators’ pref‐
erences (for a more detailed discussion see Rauh, 2020).
The distance between each co‐legislator’s position and
the Commission proposal is also determined with the
DocuToads algorithm. Following Laloux and Delreux
(2018), co‐legislators’ positionswere collected from their
public document registry. Specifically, we used the legis‐
lators’ trilogue mandates. These documents contain the
changes they officially wish to make to the Commission’s
proposals. Where the mandates contained only a list of
amendments, wemanually added them to the proposals
in order to have comparable documents.
Second, following Bunea and Thomson (2015), we
control for the number of recitals as a proxy for the
level of information intensity of a file, i.e., ‘the level of
specialist technical expertise required to participate in
policymaking’ (Bunea & Thomson, 2015, p. 522). When
negotiating with a high level of information intensity, the
co‐legislators must rely more on the technical expertise
of the Commission, which thereby enjoys more lever‐
age over the outcome. Eventually, we also control for
whether the negotiated act was a directive or not, and
for the College that negotiated the files.
Third, we also control for the scope of the pro‐
posal, that is ‘the extent to which policy effects are
spread out over multiple policy fields’ (Van Ballaert,
2017, p. 410). This allows us to differentiate between
issues that require several actors to cooperate and issues
inwhich several actors are interested and thereforewant
to participate. We measure the scope by the number of
EuroVoc descriptors (Van Ballaert, 2017).
5. So, Do They Defend Alike Proposals They
Disagree with?
We measured our variables for a sample of 216 trilogue
negotiations, that is, all the trilogues conducted and
adopted as early agreements between 2012 and 2019.
In 2012, the EP reformed its rules of procedure regarding
trilogue negotiations, which we expect to have affected
the conduct of trilogues as it led to more institutional‐
ized practices. The end date was determined by the start
of our analysis. On this basis, we tested our hypothe‐
ses by means of multiple regression analyses. Figure 1
shows the distribution of our dependent variable. Since
our original variable was extremely right‐skewed, we







0 1 2 3













Figure 1. Distribution of the dependent variable.
used its logarithm in the analysis, which enabled us
to conduct the ordinary least squares (OLS) regres‐
sions without violating its assumptions. As a robustness
check, we also conducted robust regressions, more pre‐
cisely, M‐estimators using Tukey’s biweight (BW) func‐
tion (Baissa & Rainey, 2020). The results of the robust
regressions can be found in the Supplementary File of
the article, and largely confirm those of the OLS. Table 1
presents the results of the regressions. We conducted
two models, Model 1 with only the independent vari‐
ables, adding the control variables in Model 2.
As the table shows, all variables in Model 1 are
significant, except the number of days remaining until
the next Commission (h3). Model 1 therefore confirms
that, as expected, conflicts within the Commission and
relationships with the previous College have an effect
on the amendments adopted by the co‐legislators. It is
noteworthy that all the significant variables go in the
Table 1. Regressions analysis.
(1) (2)
Decision: written −0.265*** −0.022
(0.079) (0.056)
Number of DGs consulted 0.019*** 0.009**
(0.006) (0.004)
Number of days to end of term −0.0003* −0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.0001)




Number of recitals 0.001
(0.002)
Distance with EP mandate 0.431***
(0.06)








Adjusted R2 0.148 0.636
Residual Std. Error 0.517 0.338
(df = 211) (df = 207)
F Statistic 10.342*** 47.973***
(df = 4; 211) (df = 8; 207)
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, unstandardized effect, standard error in parenthesis.
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directions we expected. Conflicts increase the extent to
which Commission proposals aremodified. Similarly, pro‐
posals issued by the previous Commission are amended
more on average. Eventually, as expected by h3, the
more time remains in the term of one commissioner, the
less a proposal will be modified. Those results suggest
that, as expected by h3, conflicts in the Commission have
an impact on the fate of proposals.
However, while interesting, those results cannot
account for the effect of conflict on the capacity of the
Commission to defend its proposals in trilogues. Indeed,
when taking the control variables out of the models, one
could interpret the findings in the sense that internal
conflicts prevent the Commission from correctly antici‐
pating the preferences of the co‐legislators. Only by con‐
trolling for the accuracy of this anticipation, i.e., the dis‐
tance between the proposal and the positions of the
co‐legislators, can one assess whether conflicts within
the Commission affect trilogue negotiations after a pro‐
posal has been issued. Therefore, testing our hypotheses
requires including those controls.
To that end, Model 2 controls for those distances
together with the other control variables. As can be seen
in Table 1, adding those variables changes the picture:
Only the number of DGs consulted (h1) remains signifi‐
cant among the independent variables. In other words,
we do not find evidence that potential disagreement
with the previous (h2) or subsequent (h3) Commission
increases deviation, nor that the mode of decision does
so (h1). Those results suggest that these now non‐
significant variables might influence how co‐legislators’
preferences are anticipated when the Commission for‐
mulates its proposals, but not the role of the Commission
in the ensuing trilogue negotiations. Figure 1 shows the
marginal effects for all the independent variables, before
and after the inclusion of the control variables. Regarding
the control variables, unsurprisingly, the distance to the
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Figure 2.Marginal effects of the independent variables without and with controls.
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amendments, but neither the number of recitals nor the
scope has a significant effect.
In sum, of all the hypotheses only h1 is partially
confirmed. Only the number of DGs consulted is sig‐
nificant, while the mode of decision is not. One possi‐
ble explanation for this difference is that the range of
intra‐institutional preferences is more important than
the intensity of conflicts. These results are in line with,
for example, the findings of Panning (2021) about intra‐
institutional Commission dynamics. While the number
of DGs measures the number of different interests
involved in the Commission process, the choice of deci‐
sion mode determines whether these differences are
so intense that they need to be settled at the highest
level, i.e., in the College. Another possible explanation
is that, if an actor has a good opportunity to slack, it is
enough to have conflicting preferences with its institu‐
tion, regardless of the intensity of this conflict (Delreux
& Adriaensen, 2017).
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to examine the effect
of intra‐institutional conflicts in the Commission on the
number of the amendments to the Commission’s legisla‐
tive proposal agreed by the co‐legislators in trilogues.
We hypothesized that such conflicts increase the num‐
ber of amendments, as the lead commissioner, who is
responsible for defending the proposal in trilogues, may
not wholeheartedly defend the Commission’s proposal.
This assumption results from the fact that the decisions
of the College are taken collectively, likely resulting in a
compromise decision. In the case of disagreements, com‐
promise decisions logically imply concessions on the part
of the commissioners (Bellamy et al., 2012) and there‐
fore do not fully correspond to the preferences of the
lead commissioner nor, probably, of any commissioner
in the College.
Furthermore, we assumed that a lead commissioner
may not fully support a proposal if they are member of
a new College, but they have to finalise trilogues that
remain open from the previous Commission. As they
have inherited the file under negotiation, they may be
willing to accept more amendments to the original pro‐
posal, since they did not decide on its content. Relatedly,
we also expected that a lead commissioner prefers to
avoid such a situation. Therefore, they may accept more
amendments if the term of the College is nearing its
end, as they want to finalise negotiations under their
mandate to not leave control to the successors. In other
words,we have hypothesised that both the fact that a file
was issued by a College other than the one that adopts
it and the proximity of the end of a College increase the
number of amendments.
We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 216 tri‐
logue negotiations conducted between 2012 and 2019.
It is important to note that we controlled for the dis‐
tance between the proposals and the positions of the
co‐legislators to ensure that our hypotheses worked as
expected, that is to say, that the effect of the conflict
was not due to a lack of anticipation on the part of the
Commission. Running the model without control vari‐
ables, all the independent variables were significant in
the expected direction. However, after adding the con‐
trols, we only found mixed evidence regarding the effect
of intra‐institutional conflict in policy formulation, and
no evidence of an effect of the relationship with other
Colleges, either preceding or following. Looking at intra‐
institutional conflicts, the number of DGs involved in the
process was significantly related to the extent of the
amendments adopted in trilogues. Themode of decision‐
making within the College, however, was not significant.
Consequently, these results suggest that the extent of
intra‐institutional conflicts in the Commission are more
important than their intensity.
All taken together, our findings make several
important contributions to understanding the hitherto
neglected role of the Commission in trilogues, as well as
to the EU legislative process more generally. First, the
effects of variables in the model without control vari‐
ables suggest that conflicts within the Commission and
with other Colleges are important for the Commission’s
ability to foresee the preferences of the co‐legislators.
Being able to foresee the co‐legislators’ preferences is
an essential ability for the Commission when developing
and writing its legislative initiatives (Bunea & Thomson,
2015; Häge&Toshkov, 2011).While our findings changed
insignificantly after adding control variables, it is possible
that disagreements within or between different Colleges
increase in importance with the increasing politicisa‐
tion and presidentialisation of the Commission. If such
developments would have negative implications for the
Commission’s ability to foresee preferences, not only
would this impact one of the most central Commission
tasks but also impact the subsequent legislative nego‐
tiations and thereby the efficiency of the EU legislative
decision‐making.
Second, commissioners do not appear to defend the
proposals adopted by their predecessors differently, nor
do they appear to fear that this will happen to their
own proposals. This may indicate that preferences do
not vary much among commissioners, or that commis‐
sioners do not have as much power in the formulation
of proposals. Certainly, however, it complements previ‐
ous findings regarding the thorough intra‐institutional
preparation of the Commission’s triloguemandates (e.g.,
Panning, 2021). Our findings suggest that the relevant
actors abide by the mandate even if it was issued by a
previous College, and that predecessors trust in this abid‐
ance of their successors. This may not come as a sur‐
prise if we take into consideration that, while the polit‐
ical level of the Commission (that is the commissioners
and their cabinets) change every five years, the officials
of the technical level (DGs and services), who assist the
commissioners and prepare the original draft proposals,
do not change (Hartlapp et al., 2014).
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From a normative perspective, this raises the issue
of potential discontinuity in EU decision‐making (König,
2007). That is, the fact that the decisions of legislative
actors, in our case the content of legislative propos‐
als, commit their successors even though their prefer‐
ences change, thus hindering the possibility of policy revi‐
sions in line with those new preferences. If this is the
case, questions regarding the possibility of Commission
control, both by the co‐legislators as well as by mem‐
ber states or EU citizens arise. For example, why select
a Commission president through the Spitzenkandidaten
procedure to make it politically more accountable if a
change of College may not make such a big difference?
Our findings may be a first indication in this direction,
but future research will have to examine this possibility
in greater detail.
Finally, the fact that the range of internal preferences
matters to the Commission in trilogues has several impli‐
cations. First, it contributes to the debate about whether
or not the Commission has power in trilogues. So far, the
Commission is often presented as a mediator between
the Parliament and the Council in trilogues. Yet, if the
intra‐institutional dynamics within the Commission are
important for trilogue outcomes beyond the anticipation
of the co‐legislators’ preferences, the Commission may
well have more influence in trilogues than assumed by
existing research. To put it simply, this suggests that the
Commission’s representatives in trilogues could, to some
extent, influence the outcome of negotiations. Hence,
we conclude that the Commission’s preferences must be
taken into account to understand the outcomes of tri‐
logues, that is EU legislation. If so, thiswould have norma‐
tive consequences, as the Commission’s legitimacy in leg‐
islative negotiations rests in part on its role as a neutral
facilitator (Tsakatika, 2005). Therefore, if the Commission
representative in trilogues promotes a particular posi‐
tion, which may, in case of intra‐institutional disagree‐
ments, differ from the Commission mandate, one could
question this legitimacy. In any case, this calls for more
research on the Commission’s role and influence in tri‐
logues. For example, how can it influence trilogue nego‐
tiations if we keep in mind that it has no formal decision‐
making power? Does the Commission rely rather on for‐
mal or informal means to persuade the Parliament and
the Council of its arguments?
Such results also have implications for our knowledge
of the internal workings of the Commission. If the lead
commissioners were indeed able to promote their posi‐
tions in trilogues to the detriment of the College’s pro‐
posal, this would mean that the Commission could very
well have its own ‘relais actors issues.’ In otherwords, the
informalisation of EU legislative decision‐making could
have had an impact on the intra‐institutional balance
of power within the Commission by favouring actors
involved in trilogues. As in the case of the co‐legislators,
such a bias would be problematic, since the Commission
as awhole is not only taskedwith promoting the EU’s gen‐
eral interest (according to the Article 17 (1) of the Treaty
on European Union) and, therefore, collegially responsi‐
ble for it, but its legitimacy is indirectly based on its rep‐
resentativity (Wille, 2012). Hence, this potential agency
cost warrants further research on the delegation to rep‐
resentatives in trilogues within the Commission, on the
possibility of agency slack from those representatives,
and on the way, they are controlled during negotiations.
Moreover, this also raises questions about both the con‐
ditions under which this slack is possible and about the
kind of conflicts that induce slack.
Looking at the aim of this thematic issue, this would
not only mean that the Commission’s preferences mat‐
ter for the output of the OLP. Moreover, the informal
rule changes resulted in outputs closer to the prefer‐
ences of the lead commissioner in the event of disagree‐
mentwithin the College. In otherwords, the shift to infor‐
mal negotiations enables the lead commissioner to exert
more influence on the outcome of the legislative pro‐
cess bymodifying the College’s proposals, whichmay not
have been possible under the formal procedure. In sum,
and to return to the quote from Kreppel (2018) that
we cited in the introduction, our results underline that
a more thorough discussion of the Commission’s role
in early agreements is necessary to better understand
both the processes within trilogues as well as within
the Commission. Therefore, our findings strongly call for
putting the spotlight of trilogue research not only on
Parliament and Council but also on the Commission as
the third of three trilogue parties.
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